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Preface
These papers represent three areas of my interest as
a graduate student at the University of Montana:
political theory, and aesthetics.

humanities,

As such they are attempts

to restore the mythic unity of instrumental and critical
reason, technology, and art through a reformulation of the
concept of labor.
The first paper discusses the emergence of instru
mental reason in Greek thought, and poses the question for
a philosophical reunification of the practical and the moral.
It is my contention that within the Western tradition, instru
mental reason emerges as controlling, and becomes a normative
force through the great Aristotelean tradition.
The second paper posits labor as an ontological
category of human existence, and discusses the possibilities
of considering labor in its full context as something more
than mere economic activity.

The historical move from the

realm of necessity to the realm of freedom is the develop
ment of reason from its instrumental footing in economic
activity to its critical possibility in art.
The third paper is a search for the ground of critical
reason in modern technological society, and is an exposition
of the thought of Jurgen Habermas and Walter Benjamin.
Habermas argues that the ground of critical theory is
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symbolic interaction, rather than the labor process under
stood as an ontological category of human existence.

I

argue that authentic and autonomous art is the unspoken
paradigm in Habermas' model:

human intersubjectivity is

the field for its operation.
Expository papers naturally owe a great deal to what
they exposit, and I am therefore indebted to the work of
Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Haberams, and Walter Benjamin, to
the guidance of Professor Ron Perrin and the Philosophy
Department, and to the Intensive Humanities Program for pro
viding the intersubjective fields in which these ideas took
root.

Naturally any inaccuracies that may be found in these

papers are my own.

11
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R E F L E C T IO N S

ON GREEK C O N S C IO U S N E S S
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Myth narrates a sacred history; it relates an
event that took place in primordial Time, the
fabled time of the 'beginnings'.
In other words,
a myth tells how, through the deeds of Super
natural Beings, a reality came into existence,
be it the whole of reality, the cosmos, or only
a fragment of reality— an island, a species of
plant, a particular kind of human behavior, an
institution.
Myth, then, is always an account
of 'creation'; it relates to how something was
produced, began to be. . . . I n short, myths
describe the various and sometimes dramatic
breakthroughs of the sacred into the World.
It
is this sudden breakthrough of the sacred that
really establishes the World and makes it what
it is today.
Furthermore, it is as a result of
the intervention of supernatural Beings that man
himself is what he is today, a mortal, sexed,
and cultural being.
Mircea Eli a d e , Myth and Reality
The Poetic Tradition :

Homer

Truth emerges out of darkness into light.

The emer

gence happens in time and is lived, perceived, and recorded
by those who recognize it and feel its compulsion.

At no

time is everything revealed to anyone, rather truth reveals
itself gradually, throughout human history, such that at
any particular moment what is revealed is incomplete.
plete, not false.

Incom

The incompleteness of truth in mythic

form has often been called, by those more sure of themselves,
"childish anthropomorphism," by which is meant that those
more sure of themselves are adult and objective observers,
removed from the shadows of time.
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Legend has it that Tiresias discovered the secret of
opposites by accident one day, while wandering in the woods.
He came upon two copulating serpents, separated them by a
stroke of his stick, and thus provoked their wrath and was
changed from a man to a woman.

He lived as a woman for

seven years, when he happened upon the two again, and hoping
that by again striking them with his stick, he would incur
the same punishment.
former gender.

This he did, and was restored to his

Having now experienced both dimensions of

human sexuality, Tiresias was called upon to settle a dis
pute between Zeus and Hera:

Zeus contending that women take

more joy in sex than men, and Hera the opposite.

Because of

Tiresias' recent experience with the opposites, he knew the
answer and took the part of Zeus, whereupon he was blinded
by the angry goddess.

As compensation and with irony,

Zeus

then gave Tiresias the opposite sight, prophecy.
The knowledge of opposites was greater even than the
knowledge of Zeus and his queen, and the sight now pos
sessed by Tiresias was itself knowledge of a higher order,
for it was knowledge of the unrevealed, of the darkness,
"lunar wisdom."^

Tiresias, from this point, plays an impor

tant role in the revelation and articulation of truth in the
Greek world.

Blind to the physical manifestations of what

has already been revealed, he becomes the seer, the one who
sees into the future by recognizing truth in darkness, and
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shadow in light.
The Homeric world is primarily the world of sunlight,
but it is sunlight that shines upon the earth without the
brilliance that eliminates shadow.

There is shadow in

Homer's world, and failure to recognize it is fatal, as is
the failure to recognize dissemblance:
always what they

seem.

things are not

Dissemblance is Odysseus' great

tactic, and one he shares with Athena, the grey-eyed god
dess.

Great danger is also great power to those who master

it, but no mortal power however great can ever master the
uncertainties and dangers and shadows of the Greek cosmos.
The recognition of man at the center of sun-drenched
Greece is made through the power and clarity of poetic
vision :
Sing in me Muse, and through me tell the story
of that man skilled in all ways of contending,
the wanderer, harried for years on end,
after he plundered the stronghold
on the proud height of Troy.
The Homeric vision, handed down through centuries of oral
tradition, is immediately sensuous, devoid of the corruption
of theoretical patter, infused with the blood and smoke of
battle.

It is the body, not the mind that carries Odysseus

on his journey, and the distance between

thought and action

collapses in the purity of nature where nothing is assumed.
The images of that Greek world dance for us more vividly
than our own reality, and that through translation from a
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"dead language."

It is the poetic sensibility, so akin to

the state of grace, that defies theoretical circumscription
by its elusive vitality, and drives the Homeric pathos to
us through all the intervening centuries, that informs the
Greek perception of nature.
The perception of nature displayed in the Odyssey is
characterized by a remarkable openness to the strange and the
mysterious.

Nothing here is accidental, and one ignores

the omens of the natural world at great peril, as when the
assembly of Ithakans foolishly chooses to ignore the eagles
launched by Zeus to warn of the impending slaughter:
Old man, go tell the omens for your children
at home, and try to keep out of trouble.
I am more fit to interpret this than you are.
Bird life aplenty is found in the sunny air,
not all of it significant.^
Unfortunately for Eurymakhos this bird life was most signi
ficant, but since he was convinced to the contrary he could
not see despite the "sunny air."
The openness to the strange and mysterious extended
past receptivity to natural phenomenon
foreign in man himself.

to the unusual and

Perhaps it was because of the geo

graphy, or the sea-faring nature of the Greek economy, or
simply the "childish wonder" at the dawn of civilization,
whatever the reason, the Homeric Greeks institutionalized
hospitality.

Odysseus was constantly at the mercy of what

ever land he found himself in— including his own, yet with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

few exceptions was accorded the finest accommodations by his
fellow humans.

This demonstration of altruism was more than

pragmatic, although there was certainly the necessity for
reciprocal aid in a sea-faring culture, it was an extension
of the Greek sense of life, the respect for the diversity
and richness of human experience.

One simply does not

refuse to recognize and acknowledge reality as it presents
itself, and to exalt the diversity of cultures and experience
without denigrating one's own roots.

Telemakhos speaks well
4
to Menelaos concerning his "islands tilted in the sea,"
in obvious reaction to the homesickness that has begun to

take its toll, but he notes well the great horse kingdom
and benefits from the alliance.
Compare the homecoming given Odysseus as he appears
to the swineherd and as he appears at his own home as a
beggar.

On one hand there is respect for the age and travels

of the poor beggar, on the other ridicule and insults.

The

two reactions are indicative of the two ways of engaging
the world;

the one with open curiosity and respect; the

other with closed hostility and arrogance.

Compare also

the fate of the swineherd with that of the suitors— both
are rewarded accordingly, the one for his openness and
respect, the other for their hubris.
The Phiakian attitude toward hospitality is ambiguous,
and gives us our first inkling that something might be amiss
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in the technological kingdom.

Odysseus needs the protection

of Pallas Athena to insure his safe passage through the
city to the great hall of King Alkinoos and Queen A r ê t ê :
You must not stare at these people, or be
inquisitive.
They do not care for strangers in this
neighborhood;
a foreign man will get no welcome here.
The only things they trust are the racing
ships
Poseidon gave, to sail the deep blue sea
like white wings in the sky, or a flashing
thought.
Their minds are firmly fixed on the technology of sea-power,
and that single-minded concentration has made them truly
formidable sailors— concentration, that is, and the blessings
of Poseidon.

As for the strange and mysterious, they have

not so much curiosity, unless it can somehow be harnessed
to the technology of sailing, and as for foreign visitors,
they offer passage from their land to all who are blown upon
it, but entrance into their land, assimilation into their
culture is unthinkable.
The technology of Phiakia is marvelous, and Odysseus
marks it well before entering the great Queen's mansion.
The orchards and vineyards and gardens with their engineered
irrigation systems

(gifts of heaven to Alkinoos, the muse

informs u s ) , the tooled and precious doors to the mansion,
and the skillful weaving of the maids-in-waiting indicate to
Odysseus a people industrious and yet quite proud of their
industry.

He abases himself before them in the ashes, this
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great warrior skilled in the ways of contending, and thereby
wins their hospitality, which is considerable.
Yet there is something wrong here, in this land of
industry and techne.

Something about the way the society

is centered strikes us as all confused, and baleful.

They

have named themselves for the functions they perform:
Beacher, Hullman, Sterman, Shipwrightson, and the infamous
Seareach whose hubris invokes Odysseus' anger.

It is as if

they have no identity apart from the instrumental force they
exert in the shipping industry, and they compensate for
this lack of substance by staging track and field games and
by their dancing.

But we notice here a country of spectators

and performers, and by far the majority spectate.

Passive

entertainment, non-engagement characterizes their leisure,
as if the effort of being the world's greatest sailors were
too much, and no other leisure were possible.

This special

ized existence is the stuff of which hubris is formed.
I'fhen the arrogant Seareach taunts Odysseus into com
peting in the track and field events, his foolishness is
answered:
That was uncalled for, friend, you talk like
a fool.
The gods deal out no gift, this one or any—
birth, brains, or speech— to every man alike.
Indeed, the gods deal out gifts, there is little call for e x 
cessive pride in their exercise.

Man may properly take pride,

but not in what has been given him.

And that is precisely
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the point, how can a man recognize that which he may properly
claim as his own from that which has been given?

And if he

cannot recognize the difference, prudence dictates modesty.
The absence of this attitude, the forgetfulness of the
sailors as to the origin of this great gift proves fatal.
They " . . .
going down,"

scud the open sea, with never a thought of
7

and gradually come to believe their gift is

their own doing, thus invoking the terrible anger of Poseidon
who turns their ship to stone in the midst of the beautiful
harbor, an eternal reminder of the follies of false pride.
In nascent form the Phiakian society embodies the
theoretical challenge to domination, although Homer refuses
to name it, indeed cannot name it yet.

The instrumental

thinking that characterizes their attitude toward nature
foreshadows the later forms of domination that have become
so familiar to our modern age.
The Greek gods of the Homeric tradition are poetic
expressions of nature and fate, they are not causal explana
tions for natural phenomenon as some recent scholars would
have us believe.*

Absent from that world are the modern

notions of cause and effect and the theoretical structures
of mind that attend the possibilities of changing the world

*This argument lies outside the scope of this paper, but com
pare the work of Mircea Eliade, Edith Hamilton, and Joseph
Campbell for the flavor of the differences.
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to suit human conventions.

Poseidon does not cause the sea

to rage and the earth to shake, he IS the sea raging and the
earth shaking, and man, if he would remain among the living,
must listen to his world and recognize his place within it.
The grey-eyed goddess speaks frequently and eloquently to
Odysseus and Telemakhos, and

her messages do not fall

quietly

in the dust because both men

are listening to their world,

and hearing its secrets.
With this Athena left him
as a bird rustles upward, off and gone.
But as she went she put new spirit in him,
a new dream Of his father, clearer now,
so that he marveled to himself
divining that a god had been his guest.
Then godlike in his turn he joined the
suitors.°
To hear the gods when they speak is to become godlike, but to
hear one must listen, and to listen one must feel a lack of
certainty, a longing for truth and a curiosity for shadow.
To be overly concerned with the revealed is to languish in
the certainty of ignorance and unfulfillment.

Man needs to

exceed himself, to wander beyond and beneath his known and
comfortable confines, his senses razored to the slightest
nuan c e .
To wander beneath is to know the past poetically; to
visit the land of the dead and to converse with the "shades"
enfuses history with a sensuous richness and a shadowy reality
that is lost in the theoretical visions of modernity.

The

theoretic historiography treats of the past as impersonal
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and abstract— cultural forces that collide and expand and
unfold in the eventual present moment.

That understanding

lacks the existential import of the Homeric vision.

Odysseus

wanders to the shadow realm of the underworld that he
might better see his future, but he sees there not the
forces of time, but the faint images of individual person
alities, whose reality is diminished through visual imagery.
Yet they speak out of the particularity of the human e x 
perience, their words have dignity and power and eloquence
and, most of all, authority.

Homer has not made prostitutes

of his ancestors, he has not tried to dominate the past, but
has called upon the muse to sing in him and to reveal his
tory as it really happened, and from the point of view of
the lived body, the embodied consciousness.
Odysseus' journey through life to eventual fulfill
ment and resolution includes a sojourn to the realm of the
dead.

But when he returns to Ithaka he comes to another

realm of the dead, the world of the suitors who are dead in
life.

The highest contempt is reserved for those who remain

at home with themselves, passive and indolent, secure in
the knowledge of good families and risking nothing.

Eury

makhos puts the suitors position succinctly:
It is a long, long time we have been waiting
in rivalry for this beauty.
We could have gone
elsewhere and found ourselves very decent wives.
Yet one suspects the "waiting in rivalry" has been a very
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different manner of contending than that Odysseus has en
dured.

The suitors have overcome nothing, risked nothing,

learned nothing because they already believe themselves to
be complete, needing only Penelope to ensure their virility.
The gods no longer speak to them because they have stopped
listening, and they stopped listening because they believe
they already know the message, and that because they have
never risked self knowledge before the awesome power of
nature.

Instead of wandering and searching, they have stag

nated in the self-assurant complacency of good breeding and
become corpulent on the labor of another, far, far greater
strength and understanding, Odysseus.
To Odyssey; to wander, to journey, to exceed the
bounds of self-knowledge by challenging the world, to dis
cover one's identity by exceeding it, to gain one's life by
losing it.

The Homeric understanding of selfhood is perhaps

the single most attractive feature of that primitive world.
The deepest, darkest and most vile sin one can commit is to
BE as a suitor, to refuse self-transcendence, to wait for
life to happen.

Knowledge is based upon a commitment to the

world, a risking of one's private, mortal and fragile self.
It cannot be gained vicariously.

The electrifying slaughter

of the suitors illustrates the point most graphically.

The

suitors had never engaged in mortal combat and were utterly
unprepared for the sudden horrible violence, their realization
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crept over them slowly as they fell quivering in the blood
soaked dust, pathetically, hopelessly, inexorably.
He drew to his fist the cruel head of an arrow
for Antinoos
just as the young man leaned to lift his beauti
ful drinking cup,
embossed, two-handled, golden:
the cup was in
his fingers:
the wine was even at his lips:
and did he
dream of death?
How could he?
In that revelry amid his throng
of friends
who would imagine a single foe— though a strong
foe indeed—
could dare to bring death's pain on him and dark
ness on his eyes?
Odysseus' arrow hit him under the chin
and punched up to the feathers through his throat.
Backward and down he went, letting the wine cup
cup fall
from his shocked hand.
Like pipes his nostrils
jetted
crimson runnels, a river of mortal red,
and one last kick upset his table
knocking the bread and meat to soak in dusty
blood.
The suitors sinned not only against themselves, and
nature, and the gods, but also against Ithakian society.
"The Flower of Ithakian Youth" Odysseus calls them, the hope
of the future.

They sinned against themselves by their ar 

rogant complacency; against nature and the gods by taking
both for granted and refusing to hear and engage their world;
and against Ithakian society by their disrespect for Law and
the conventions of hospitality.

The recognition of human

frailty is the root of the conventions of hospitality (one
might argue the root of Homeric notions of god and nature
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also), and man never seems to need those conventions so long
as he has health, strength, and the blessings of the gods,
but when the gods abandon us, we suffer terribly, and in that
lonely suffering we need each other.
No man should flount the law,
but keep in peace what gifts the gods may give.
Odysseus refers to The Law here, not laws.

To have contempt

for law itself is the height of human arrogance and stupidity,
the ultimate sin of hubris.

To have contempt for Law is to

have contempt for the human conditions that make us all
humble before fate and the gods, it is to deny our essential
humanity and to set oneself above the human condition, to
assume a godly posture.

That is one sin the world never

fails to punish unmercifully.
Odysseus struggles to regain his homeland where peace,
based on the natural order and rhythm of the world, reigns
over a society of diversity, creativity, nobility, and power.
Ithakian society is based upon law, both human and natural,
and custom, the most important being the custom of hospi
tality.

The Homeric value that radiates throughout is open

ness to the world and its unfathomable and mysterious
nuances, and respect for the power and violence of nature—
society being the human palliative to the unpredictability
of individual existence.

Man is not yet the political animal

he will become in the Athenian polis, but neither is he the
instrumental theorist he becomes in the Alexandrian Empire.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14

Primitive Instrumentalism:

Sophocles

The transition from Homeric Kingdom to Athenian Polis
is marked by the transition from a poetic understanding of
life that is grounded in immediacy and innocent openness,
to a primitively theoretical understanding grounded in the
problem-solving mentality of Oedipus and characterized by
the illusion of control.

The plague ravishes Sophocles'

Athens as it ravishes Thebes, and the reaction of the
Athenian citizenry is recognized in the reaction of the
Theban chorus.
Oedipus has saved Thebes from the cruel Sphinx by
solving the famous riddle, and is justly rewarded with
Kingship— the deification of primitive instrumental thought
and its power to control.

Primitive theory replaces poetic

sensibility; the power to abstract the world into causal
relationships replaces the power to hear the world and find
one's place within its mysteriousness.

Primitive theory

becomes concrete practice with the attempt to control nature
and the gods.

It purpose is not understanding but power.

The questions one asks of the world generally determine the
answers one receives, and in the case of Thebes, the question
has become one of expediency:
Find us our safety, find us a remedy.
Whether by counsel of the gods or men.
A King of wisdom tested in the past
Can act in a time of troubles, and act well.^^
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The Priest and the Theban chorus have become dependent upon
Oedipus for relief from the terrible realities of life in
the doomed city, and beg him to give them peace.

They have

become as children before the problem-solving power of
Oedipus, and can no longer stand alone.

They have abdicated

their power to the instrumentalism of theoretical thought,
and have thereby emasculated themselves.
See, how our lives like birds take wing.
Like sparks that fly when a fire soars.
To the shore of the god of evening.
Even in the primitive stages of its appearance, the logic
of instrumental thought is present, its aim is the control
of men.

In its extreme forms it becomes domination, the end

of freedom, the end of poetic existence.
The Thebans have lost touch with themselves and their
gods, and offer only prayer to their "Dearest expectancy,"
speech in lieu of the blood sacrifice that so powerfully
tied the Homeric Greek to a revered world.
What is God singing in his profound
Delphi of gold and shadow?
What oracle for Thebes, the sunwhipped city?
Fear ixnjoints me, the roots of my heart tremble.
The sunwhipped city basks in the icy brilliance of Oedipal
reason, but they are incapable of acknowledging the shadow
from which all truth emerges, the shadow that lies at the
heart of their own existence.

None can be sure of the

source of his own engendering, the most fundamental origin
of biological existence, and it is curious that the Odyssey
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opens with Telemakhos saying similar words to Pallas
Athena.

15

Sophocles could hardly have been unaware of the

irony he was proposing, of the stark contrast between the
sunwhipped mentality of Athens and the poetic consciousness
of Homeric Greece.

The hubris that treats its ancestors as

prostitutes is embodied in the hubris of Oedipus, for all
his admirable searching for the truth.

Yet Oedipus searches

for the truth of his past that he might wield it against his
fate, and thereby gain control of destiny itself, surely a
sin that will not go unnoticed by the gods.

While Athenian

Greece saw the legends of Homer as childish superstition,
they were amidst the most debilitating consciousness since
its rejection.

The poetic understanding of the world they

saw, rightly, as incomplete, its rejection in favor of its
opposite was fatal, for here lies the nascent form of what
will become a Dionysian frenzy; the passion for control of
passion itself.
Oedipus' excessive pride in his theoretical prowess
leads him to believe that possession of the truth will give
him control of his fate.

But the truth always emerges from

shadow, and is at no time fully revealed.
reason against the oracles.

Man cannot wield

No matter how brilliantly the

fires of reason burn, they never illuminate their origins;
about origins there must always be doubt.

Failure to

respect the shadowy realm of the past results in defilement
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for Oedipus and the Thebans, and one must say, also for the
Athenians themselves

(although their's is a very special

case, involving defilement of one's ancestors by illumi
nating their lives with the poverty of the immediate future
of one's own reason).

It involves the elimination of diver

sity from the world, for b y denying its existence in the
past, one necessarily excludes it from the future.
But I say that you, with both your eyes, are
blind:
You can not see the wretchedness of your life.
Nor in whose house you live, no, nor with whom.
Who are your father and mother?
Can you tell
me?
You do not even know the blind wrongs
That you have done them, on earth and in the
world below.16
Primitive Theory:

Socrates

Oedipus Rex was written at the time when Athenian
society was suffering most.

The plague was a real biological

catastrophe and a pervasive social contagion.

The move from

polis to empire created a new aristocracy whose moral values
and educational needs were at odds with the old ruling aris
tocracy who held sway prior to the Peloponnesian wars.
Political leadership no longer flowed in aristocratic blood
as a matter of natural course, but rather depended largely
on the powers of persuasion displayed by those whose aris
tocratic

values were rooted in the new commercialism.

The

highest virtue was to be successful in manipulating the new
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democracy, and for that purpose a new educational class
arose:

the Sophists.
Thq virtuous and successful life becomes the life

that displays maximum control over political, economic and
intellectual relationships, and while the Sophists had little
in common with each other, they were in agreement on how
virtue was to be demonstrated.

This situation led to some

interesting ethical arrangements since it reduced virtue
from its transcendental and universal status to a situ
ational and instrumental ground.

The ethical relativism

of many of the Sophists led to its contradiction:

situ

ational ethics have their own logic, and it is the logic of
control.

No matter that there is no absolute moral system

that is for all people at all times, the guiding principle
is to control whatever situation one finds oneself in ac
cording to the dictates of self-interest, as in the philos
ophy of Protagoras, for whom "man is the measure of all
things."

This in turn tended to create an homogeny that

threatened to eliminate all diversity in Greek society; the
destruction of Melos but one demonstration.
In contest against sophistry, Socrates attempts to
keep the poetic understanding alive in the face of a bur
geoning instrumentalism that threatens to reduce the
mysteries of the world to mind-dependency.

He most ade

quately sees what is at stake in the new understanding, and
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sees it as hostile to the quality of life in the Athenian
polis.

He describes it as a form of hubris that assumes

theoretical language by itself sufficient to explicate the
content of experience and to manipulate that content to
suit the conventions of a blind present.
Those who pretend to possess knowledge of such vir
tues as piety, justice, love, equality, and courage are
called into question by Socrates to explain themselves.

As

usually happens, the defended concepts are vacuous and con
sequently capable of being juxtaposed in contradiction one
to the other.

What was originally thought capable of pos

session proves to be possessed with the intangible character
of a relationship, whose vitality is contingent upon mai n 
taining a reciprocity through questioning.

This is the

Socratic method, pushing constantly deeper into the given
in an attempt to find the shadowy adumbrations of distinc
tion, of reality, where words can no longer follow.

When

Euthyphro, for example, is convinced that he has the answer
to the question "what is piety?" he ceases his questioning
and rests in assurance that the matter is closed.

He, like

Oedipus, is ignorant of his ignorance and therefore doubly
blinded to the rich mysteriousness of piety.

The wise man

is the one who knows that he does not know, and who there
fore continues to question and allows the world to reveal
itself.
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Themes of light and dark appear again in the Socratic
dialogues, constantly reminding us that all is not revealed,
and that much of what can be revealed can only be expressed
in mythic and poetic form;
Soon I found that it is not by wisdom that the
poets create their works, but by a certain in
stinctive inspiration, like soothsayers and
prophets, who say many fine things, but under
stand nothing of what they say.l'
The fact that poets may not "understand" what they say does
not make what they say false, but rather indicates an in
ability on their part to see the total context in which what
they say has the character of truth; what they say is incom
plete.

There are varying degrees of completeness, of illumi

nation, yet man seldom meets with the condition of total
revelation.

Truth emerges from the murky realm of appear

ance in mysterious ways, and it would seem that Socrates has
more sympathy for the poet who still speaks through the
world out of existentiality than for the Sophist who manip
ulates forms without content in an attempt to possess the
world abstractly.

Present in the poet is a kind of love

that does not reduce itself to the desire to possess and
manipulate; precisely what the Sophist attempts.
in the Athenian citizenry,

Similarly

as it comes to us through the

Theban chorus of Sophocles, is the inverse Sophistic ten
dency to be possessed by the theoretical knowledge that
obviates the insecurity of painful inquiry.

Such concept

ualizations are empty and amount to a rejection of the world
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and the assumption of deafness through pride.
Much more is given us in the erotic character of
knowledge in the Symposium than would appear at first blush.
If wisdom is love of knowledge, says Socrates, then we would
do well to pay attention to the nature of love.

If that

relationship is characterized by the desire of the lover
to possess the beloved, in the process of domination the
desired is reduced to an object and is divested of the
quality that makes it lovable, namely its power to freely
reciprocate.

Staleness replaces the freshness that was the

first attraction, inertia replaces dynamic reciprocity, the
diverse mysteriousness that injects the love relationship
with its vitality is given over to deadening homeostasis—
boredom.

The beloved can now be wielded, but only as some

thing inert in which is hidden the condition of bondage for
lover and beloved alike.

Bondage for the lover because he

is enslaved by the limits of his knowledge and blind to its
possibilities; bondage for the beloved because it has been
silenced and petrified into one of its many dimensions.

If

the object of love is knowledge, the implication is not the
bondage of the world but its death.

The world and its

'gods'

no longer speak because we no longer listen, and we no
longer listen because there is no such necessity now that
we are in possession of the truth.

The openness of the

Homeric world is closed and hubris reigns as the predominant
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mode of consciousness; a hubris most insidiously revealed
in Athenian imperialism.
Poetry abounds in the Platonic dialogues, and at no
point in Plato's epistemology and metaphysics is it more
crucial than in the "Myth of the Cave."

The poetic ex 

pression of the theory of forms is indicative of Platonic
theory, still infused with a sense of the mysterious and
grounded in the visual imagery of light and shadow, it charactizes the sun as the power that informs all reality,
illuminates it, nourishes it and throws shadows into it,
and answers our ultimate questions.

Answers our ultimate

questions provided, of course, that we ask them, that we
recognize the need within ourselves to probe beneath the
apparent and utilitarian surface of our lives.

We are left

with the impression that one must return to the cave to
force one's fellows from the realm of darkness and sub
jectivity.
The richly ambiguous character of the realm of ap
pearances demands a questioning openness through which
glimpses of the real world of forms are conceivable.

The

progress through the world from shadows to the form of the
good cannot be accomplished by anything less than a total
giving of one's understanding to the world in a relationship
of reciprocity that categorically precludes the possession
of truth.

Respect for the ambiguity of the lived experience
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retains the poetic sense of life found in the Homeric ex
perience and lost in the classical age.

This loss did not

go unlamented, nor was it total; but primitive theory
rapidly jettisoned poetry for instrumentality, openness for
domination, wisdom for technology.

This is apparent in

Platonic thought itself, and in the interpretations of
Platonic thought that will come.
The realm of forms will come to be seen as static,
unchanging and eternal things, a product of the misunder
standings of instrumental thought.

The eternal character

of the forms resides in the paradigmatic relationships they
embody; relationships that more resemble values than objects
existing in the nether realm.

The unfortunate instrumen

talist tendency has been to fix these relations with lan
guage, to name them and thus render them objective and
manipulable.

Nothing could be further from the Socratic

spirit of the early Plato.
Thus the two major connections of the Platonic tra
dition with the Homeric are the attempts to keep the world
open and alive through a recognition of the poverty of human
understanding, and understanding human knowledge as an
erotic relationship that demands a commitment into the world.
Both are contrary to the acquisitive character of instru
mentalist thought and to the impulse to dominate and con
trol nature by means of which that acquisition is accom
plished.
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Theoretical Instrumentalism;

Aristotle

. . . It is not the function of the poet to
relate what has happened, but what may
happen— what is possible according to the
law of probability or necessity.
Aristotle, Poetics
1451
The break between the primitive theoretical thought
found in the writings of the early Plato and the theoretical
instrumentalism of Aristotle becomes most apparent in the
later writings of Aristotle, when he has moved far beyond
the influences of the Academy.

Aristotle remains a Pla-

tonist insofar as he continues to concern himself with the
epistemological quandry of reality and illusion, the one
and the many, and the problem of change; but he abandons the
early Socratic spirit in developing his Nicomachean Ethi c s.
Aristotle took his direction from the most instru
mentalist of the Platonic notions, the theory of forms, and
sought to solve the "participation problem" by developing a
teleological metaphysics that embedded form in matter as
that toward which particular matter purposively developed.
His theory was an improvement on the Platonic theory of forms
only so long as one remained on the level of the mundane,
i.e., his theory adequately accounts for biological change
only so long as one maintains the Platonic hiatus between
matter and value.

Aristotle's metaphysics is no improvement
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over the dualities of Platonic theory on the level of value
because that toward which all matter tends is thought, and
the source of all movement is the "unmoved mover"; nature
become thoroughly rational.
The spiritual difference implied in Aristotle's
metaphysics is at the heart of what is meant by "instru
mental thought."

Plato thought that reality became more

intelligible as one's questions sharpened, as one's ability
to interact with nature became more acute.

And this acumen

could only be acquired by a constant, unremitting attempt
to move beyond the apparent and obvious to the ground of
being which ultimately revealed the revealing power.
Platonic theory was explicitly utopian.

Hence

Aristotle, on the

other hand, felt the compulsion to examine reality in terms
of particularity

(inductively, if one uses the term

advisedly), and to find therein a purpose.

His attribution

to reality of purposiveness at the outset is the hallmark of
all instrumental thought:

what is the social meaning of

attributing purposiveness to nature when that purposiveness
is value?

From the point of view of an ordered and well

intentioned teleology, nature

(and human nature) displays

itself as an orderly array of manipulable potentialities,
and it remains only to harness them to the services of a
higher form.

Nature, rather than a mysterious and sacred

play of forces and relationships, might now appear as an
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ordered hierarchy of values, the major value being the
realization of form, and the more inclusive the form, the
more cosmic value it has.
ethics:

The four-fold implication for

1) There is one end (form)

for man; 2) That end

exists in a hierarchy of other potentialities;
knowable;

3) It is

4} It is possible to create conditions favorable

to the realization of that form.
These four conditions taken together comprise the
definition of domination:

the instrumental implications of

hubris released from their mythic core.

Aristotle does not

show that there is only one end for man, and he certainly
does not show that it is rational and knowable.

Indeed,

how could he know the final end of man unless he were god,
unless he possessed the most inclusive kind of knowledge
imaginable, unless he somehow stood at the end of the
hierarchy of value where Plato placed the Form of the Good?
Aristotle's philosophy is the most startling example of
hubris in the Greek tradition, and it is made particularly
onerous by the fourth point:

that it is possible to create

conditions favorable to the realization of human potential
ity— by manipulating the natural and social environment in
which man finds himself.
. . . He who bids the law rule may be deemed
to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who
bids man rule adds an element of the beast;
for desire is a wild beast, and passion pe r 
verts the minds of rulers, even when they are
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the best of men.
The Law is reason unaf
fected by desire. . . . The law has no power
to command obedience except that of habit . . .
so that a readiness to change from old to new
laws enfeebles the power of the law.18
Here is real evidence of the emergence of the will to con
trol, which contravenes the Homeric tradition by assuming
the possession of some form of truth that acts as the basis
upon which nature and man might be dominated.

In the

attempt to purge human consciousness of the disruptive in
fluence of beastly passion, that very passion to control
becomes consuming and frenetic— the "control frenzy" in the
service of Reason.
Aristotle clearly articulates the consciousness of
the coming Alexandrian Empire, the end of hospitality toward
the world, and the beginning of control and domination
through a classificatory science that seeks to bring an end
to ambiguity by naming it.

No longer will men perfect them

selves by listening to the world and being in touch with the
gods as mysterious and unfathomable realities, but rather
they habituate themselves and their activities to accepted
custom in an attempt to render their activities automatic
and predictable, the dawn of instrumental man.
Aristotle lived in a world where it was not difficult
to pay homage to one political form while tacitly supporting
its contradiction.

Alexander was in the process of destroy

ing the foundations of the political state, which served as
the basis for Aristotle's Politics, through the most complete
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policy of conquest that had been known to that time.

Im

perialism contradicted the diversity of political units
(the polis)

that were the social fabric of the greatness of

classical Greece.

Greece rapidly became stagnant, both

politically and intellectually partly because of the new con
sciousness evidenced by the philosophies of instrumental
control, which taken at their word, would have left little
room for the further development of the poetic sensibility.
The enthronement of the passion for control dethrones the
passion for understanding, and the understanding is the
most powerful force in the liberation of man from the domi
nation of nature.
Conclusion
The origins of the instrumentalist tradition in
Western philosophy lie deep in the Greek tradition, origi
nating in Athenian Greece with the derogation of Homer, and
reaching articulate form in the writings of Aristotle.

It

is important to see this tradition as a long one, present
in the intellectualist Greek tradition as it merges with the
spiritualist Hebraic to form that singular confluence that
is our cultural heritage.

One might also find the spiritual

permission to dominate nature in the first book of Genesis
(Genesis 1:26), and the discussion would lead to similar
result:

when the world, including man, is seen as something
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to be dominated, as the field for the play of instrumental
reason, it ceases to be an object of reverence.

This loss

of reverence characterizes our green age, despite what the
poets can do to indicate "the possible."
The force that through the green fuse drives
the flower
Drives my green age; that blasts the roots of
trees
Is my destroyer.
And I am dumb to tell the crooked rose
My youth is bent by the same wintry fever.
Dylan Thomas
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The union of Logos and Eros led already in
Plato to the supremacy of Logos; in Aristotle,
the relation between the god and the world
moved by him is "erotic" only in terms of
analogy.
Then the precarious ontological
link between Logos and Eros is broken, and
scientific rationality emerges as essentially
neutral.
What nature (including man) may be
striving for is scientifically rational only
in terms of the general laws of motion—
physical, chemical or biological.
Herbert Marcuse
^
One Dimensional Man
Instrumental Reason and Domination
Instrumental reason reigned supreme in the Aristotelean and medieval world views in an ambiguous way:

the

level of mastery over the natural environment was not yet
highly developed, consequently the realm of human needs was
not highly articulate and the religious and philosophical
systems tended to devalue those dimensions of human activity
concerned with the satisfaction of primitive needs.

The

Renaissance and the revolution in scientific and philo
sophical thought that attended the decline of Catholic
hegemony broke the hold of repression in many spheres of
human activity, particularly in the relations between society
and nature, and in the relations between species and indi
vidual being.

The most startling result of these changes

was the development of a quantitatively certain and value-
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free science, and the diremption of human reality into the
Cartesian categories, the dualities of which persist in
human consciousness well into the twentieth century.
The development of a "value-free" science is, of
course, the product of a value itself— the value of domi
nation, mastery, and power over things in our world.

Its

major characteristic is the reduction of quality to quantity,
the perception of nature as the source of use-values ac
cessible through the language of mathematics.

All matter is

in motion, and motion is mathematically describable and pre
dictable.

The matter and the motion have no value in them

selves, apart from that assigned them according to the
satisfaction of human needs.
The realm of the mundane,

from the point of view of

medieval scholasticism, became the primary field for human
activity from the sixteenth century on, and the realm of
value, the world as object of reverence, became the mundane
world of "subjectivity" from the point of view of the new
science.

This reversal of human interests is classic in

form because it does not recognize itself as dialectically
motile until the nineteenth century, and then originally
only from the point of view of idealism.

All things in

the field of human consciousness that do not serve instru
mental purpose

(the domination of nature) are consequently

devalued, and nature is exclusively perceived as the source
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of human use-values.
The domination of nature is an ambiguous phrase, made
the more so by its original articulation in the book of
Genesis (1:26), and its current popularity as descriptive of
modern technology.

The major problem with the phrase

"domination" is, as William Leiss has pointed out,

that

only other men can, properly speaking, be the object of
domination, since domination implies the conscious recog
nition of the master's authority.

Similarly, when we speak

of man's domination of nature, we imply by our language a
cohesive subject

(Man as species-being)

that does not exist.

The reality is that men dominate each other

(internal nature)

in their attempt to render nature accessible to the demands
of human utility.

It is not science nor technology that

dominate man, but man himself.

Consequently neither science

nor technology can accomplish the liberation of Man, al
though both may be tools in the liberation of men.
When we speak of the domination of nature, we speak
of the domination of men by other men; when we speak of the
mastery of nature, we speak of the control of nature as
source of use-value by men of an historically determinate
social class.

The reified language of sociology often over

looks this rather obvious and important distinction, thus
contributing to the notorious illusion that the mastery of
nature is itself somehow mastered.

The tension between
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species being and individual being that is also found in
the first two books of Genesis as the created beings of
Man and Adam, persists in our time more dangerously than ever
before.

It is all too possible for men acting in accordance

with the dictates of their historically determinate needs to
do permanent violence to the larger needs of species sur
vival, and the consequence of that transgression would be
as momentous as the expulsion from the garden of Eden.
Science represents the interests of eros, technology
the interests of domination and mastery vis a vis the n a t 
ural world— both internal and external, and for this reason
they are not the same thing.^

Technology serves as the

"concrete link between the mastery of nature through scien
tific knowledge and the enlarged disposition over the
resources of the natural environment which supposedly con5
stitutes the mastery of nature in the everyday world."
Technology is thus more immediately connected to the every
day world of social conflict and repression, and therefore
is more susceptible to the excesses of instrumental reason
than is science.
Instrumental reason in its most virulently onedimensional form announces the "demythologization of the
world,"® the rendering of nature and human experience totally
transparent to rational explanation, and the resultant
derogation of all phenomenon not amenable to reason's
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approach.

We have seen reason perform this reduction in

the Oedipus Cycle , and traced its motion through classical
Greece to Aristotle with the same result:

with the approach

of radically instrumentalist reason, the world shrinks into
mathematically manipulable constructions administered by
human ingenuity for the apparent good of the species.
Mystery and ambiguity, rhythm and reverence exist only in
sofar as they can present themselves as something control
lable and beneficial, and even then their mystery is some
thing to be attacked and reduced to verifiable knowledge.
Openness to multi-dimensional reality is not consonant with
the project of control and administration that dominates the
drive for self-preservation and informs modern technology.
If nature is really as Descartes suggests, bodies in lawful
motion, then the human project in terms of that nature is to
develop mathematically verifiable methods of predicting the
motion in order to render the world OURS.
The attempt to control nature through technology takes
place in a social and historical context that promotes un
reason.

Man does not dominate nature, men do.

And the domi

nation is of internal nature, of other men as things to be
administered and controlled.

The object of the techno

logical project, material security, is unattainable given
the character of human needs in commodity culture, and the
attempt to wield the world becomes increasingly irrational
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and pathological as competition for the planet's resources,
both human and material, becomes more fierce.

The world no

longer appears hospitable;
The sustained effort of demythologizing in
modern times ends by stripping the world of
all inherent purpose. . . . The consequence
of this view is to set the relationship of
man and the world inescapably in the context
of domination. . . .7
The situation we face is one in which the world has
become objectless, the competition among individuals for
economic security has rendered human intersubjectivity
problematic.

The tangible sensuousness of the world is

superseded by mathematics, the openness and hospitality of
social relationships destroyed by an instrumental reason
gone mad with the will to domination.

The individual human

being, still caught in the web of a psychological Cartesianism he cannot fathom cries out in vain:
Where now? Who now? When now? Unquestioning.
I, say I. Unbelieving.
Questions, hypotheses,
call them that.
Keep going, going on, call
that going, call than on.
Can it be that one
day, off it goes on, that one day ^ simply
stayed i n , in w h e r e , instead of going o u t , in
the old way, out to spend day and night as far
away as possible, it wasn't far.
Perhaps that
is how it began.
You think you are simply
resting, the better to act when the time comes,
or for no reason, and you soon find yourself
powerless ever to do anything again.
No matter
how it happened.
It, say it, not knowing what.
Perhaps I simply assented at last to an old
thing.
But I did nothing.
I seem to speak,
it is not I, about me, it is not about me
(emphasis added).8
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Men are alienated and dominated in technological
society, they have turned within, seeking in privatism and
narcissism what the "polis" can no longer give them, yet in
at least one way men continue to be free:
as artists.

in their labor

Artistic labor continues to offer authenticity

and self-fulfillment in a world where there is little of 
fered elsewhere, in a world where the contradictions of the
industrial state blind us to the realities of economic im
perialism.

Art continues to nurture the tension between

what is and what ought to be, between form and content,
and suggests to us an apotheosis of labor.

Labor itself

appears as an ontological category of human existence,
whether that labor be authentic or alienated, free or ex 
ploited, rational or irrational.

Through reflection on the

character of labor generally, and artistic labor particular
ly, we find what salvation there may be in the dissolution
of post-capitalist technocracy.
Critical Reason and Labor
It seems macabre that the forces the Renaissance
heralded as humanly liberating, should, five hundred years
after their diffident appearance, be recognized as d e 
humanizing.

We nevertheless live that unfortunate eventu

ality today, and see only theoretical solutions of dubious
practical value.

Those incredible powers of nature.
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harnessed and unleashed by man's sagacity, now stalk him
with inexorable persistence in the shape of nuclear weaponry
and the nightmare assembly line.

The promised liberation

from want, from material scarcity, has not been forthcoming,
and does not appear on the horizon of the twentieth cen
tury.

In the attempt to dominate nature and render it trans

parent to human needs, the self-domination of man has been
effectively accomplished, and our specifically human in
stitutions have lost sight of their generally human
functions.
The ordering and consolidation of productive tech
niques for the purpose of the domination of nature is called
by Marcuse technological rationality, to which he posits two
further forms of rationality which are not intrinsically
contradictory:
9
rationality.

individual rationality and critical
Individual rationality originally functioned

as an attack upon feudal institutions that fettered the free
development of human reason in all spheres of human activ
ity, religious, political, economic, and scientific.

The

object avowed by the bourgeois rationalists was the liber
ation of man from the established and stagnant status quo,
consequently individual rationality was also critical
rationality.

Individual rationality eventually held sway,

however briefly, and for a time during the Renaissance
seemed to hold within it the promised liberation.

But the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

promises of bourgeois liberalism were soon overshadowed by
the realities of commodity production, which commodity pro
duction was justified in the first instance by the desire
to overcome the enslaving life-style demanded by the battle
against scarcity.

The first steps toward the realm of free

dom* were taken self-consciously; the rationality that il
luminated this self-consciousness was soon subsumed by the
demands of the technology it deemed necessary to the task.
As economic units expanded in size, the founding rationality
of individual freedom gave way to the necessities of indus
trial production, i.e., individual rationality was trans
formed into technological rationality, and peformed the fur
ther service of an ideological justification of its opposite,
the Protestant Ethic.

Yet one must emphasize that the two

modes of rationality are not, in their pristine and essential
forms, mutually exclusive; the extension of nature under the
domain of an instrumental reason that includes men as adminis
tered energy makes them appear contradictory.

However, this

moment in the species life of human labor was a necessary
moment without which the battle to overcome scarcity could
never have been fought.

*The realm of necessity which Marx describes in Capital
should have ended with the accumulation phase of capitalist
development.
Its persistence is not indicative of the impos
sibility of realizing the realm of freedom, but rather is
testimony to the increasing irrationality of capitalism in
the dis-accumulation phase.
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At work in the transition from a free market economy
is the "invisible hand of the market," Adam Smith's euphe
mism for the mis-guided self interest and historical blind
ness of eighteenth century intellectuals who sponsored the
ideological dimensions of the individual rationality.
Individuals are stripped of their individuality,
not by external compulsion, but by the very
rationality under which they live. . . . True,
the force which transforms human performance
into a series of dependable reactions is an e x 
ternal force:
the machine process imposes upon
men the patterns of a mechanical behavior . . .
but man . . . relinquishes his liberty to the
dictum of reason itself.
The point is that
today the apparatus to which the individual is
to adjust and adapt himself is so rational
that individual protest and liberation appear
not only as hopeless but as utterly irrational.
The system of life created by modern industry
is one of the highest expediency, convenience
and efficiency.
Reason, once defined in these
terms, becomes equivalent to an activity which
perpetuates this world.
Rational behavior
becomes identical with a matter-of-factness
which teaches reasonable submissiveness and
thus guarantees getting along in the prevailing
order.10
Marcuse here indicates the danger of technology in
another light, the Marxian notion of reproduction.

Through

his labor the laborer literally reproduces the conditions of
his servitude and subsequently encounters the alientated
product of his own labor in the commodity market as something
he must purchase again.

The further implication of the sub

jective transformation that occurs in his attendance upon
the productive apparatus will be considered later, but at
this point we can anticipate the transformation as the
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virtual opposite of the transformation that occurs in the
labor of the artist (providing that labor is not also
alienated by the "art industry").

The stifling of human

development within the productive process is not a ncessary
consequence of that process per se, but is rather a func
tion of a social organization which perpetuates an arti
ficial scarcity and persists in an irrational conquest of
nature.

Marcuse advocates a revival of critical reason as

one means of liberating man from domination by the social
order— which domination is accomplished by and through the
uncritical affirmation of an unjust and inhuman industrial
administration.

The truth of the domination of man is

revealed by the domination of nature, i.e., its ordering
methodology:

" . . .

the cunning of unreason is revealed in

the persistent illusion that the undertaking known as the
'mastery of nature' is itself mastered."11
Enough has been said in the past few years concerning
the machinations of man in the face of alienated labor.
Much modern art can be seen as a reflection of that more
pervasive alienation, and indeed the consequences of
alienated and historically determinate labor have been seen
as the futile destiny of Man expanded to ontological pro
portions.

The importance of alienated labor at this point

is to note the extent to which we have been pushed back into
our subjectivity in a desperate attempt to find there what
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has been denied us in the world of our creating.

The re

treat back into ourselves is really the loss of our sub
jectivity, because we meet there the worm at the core of
our being, a profound lack.

What we are does not consist

merely in some internal synthesis, opaque to the 'other',
although there is that too, but also in our inter-subjective
being, in our ability to communicate that hollowness, that
numbing angst, with dignity and grace.
Labor is not essentially economic activity, and the
problem in any consideration of labor is to overcome our
historical prejudice to view it as such.

This prejudice is

born of the infatuation with classical and neo-classical
economics, with an overscrupulous concern for the dynamics
of the market place.

The market place concerns the vast

majority of Western economics for several obvious reasons;
the implicit assumption that human needs are insatiable and
that the locus for the unceasing satisfaction of those needs
must be controlled; a penchant for quantitative methodol
ogies that must operate on an ex post facto basis in order
to have any 'data' with which to work; a recognition

of the

intractability of human motives which defies quantification
and therefore necessitates a focus on the market place; a
shared prejudice for objectivity which also characterizes
the psychology which provides economics with respectable
motivations— the list seems endless.

Significant for our
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purposes is not so much what neo-classical economics chooses
to address, as what it chooses not to address— the labor
process.
The long historical prejudice in favor of objectivity
and scientific methodology has prepared the way for an un
critical economic theory.

It is uncritical because it has

not yet come to terms with the truth it describes, being
infatuated with its apparent utility in the post-Keynsian
world of managed economies, and it is a prejudice because it
has become an apology for a politico-economic system the con
tradictions of which now require a dazzling array of theo
retical revisions.

We now see the problem in terms of

instrumental reason and realize the futility of an "objective"
economics in a world where objectivity is the specious
result of scientific symbology, mathematics.

The metho

dologies, like the Ptolemaic mathematics which buttressed
that structure and were reincorporated into the new, appear
no longer capable of bridging the chasm between theory and
practice, resulting in considerable embarrassment for the
dismal science.
Another Copernican Revolution is needed that will set
the question anew.

This new formulation of the question

needs to be addressed not to the ends of labor as economic
activity, but to the means through which these ends are pro
duced.

The prejudice for looking at human labor as
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exclusively economic activity is anachronistic, part of a
cultural preoccupation with material scarcity and security
that is deeply embedded in its history, and which must be
overcome.

It cannot be overcome by the perpetual recapi

tulation of methodologies which focus on the products of
human labor as if they appear magically.

The realization of

human labor as more than merely economic activity is con
tingent upon abandoning the fetish for commodities and con
cerning ourselves with the process in which man becomes Man.
The move away from objectivity is not necessarily a move
into subjectivity, but a move into an area of being where
such dualities are mediated, nothing less than the restor
ation of mythic unity.
Everywhere we find man we find him at work in the
world, we find him laboring.

A prior state, where the world

is immediately given in its fullness without the mediating
activity of human labor is conceivable only in a pre-mythic
sense, only in terms familiar to us in the biblical imagery
of Eden.

The development out of Eden provides us with a two

fold conception of nature as object of reverence and source
of use-value.

In the latter dimension we find labor as a

necessary condition of human existence.

As a necessary con

dition of human existence labor is more than a specific
human economic activity, it is a social and historial doing
that encompasses man's entire Being and shapes his world.
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. . . Labor is precisely not a specific human
'activity' (for no single activity comprehends
and penetrates the totality of human existence
. . .); rather, labor is that in which every single
activity is founded and to which they again return;
a doing (Tun). And it is precisely the doing
of human beings as the mode of one's being in the
world:
it is that through which one first be
comes "for itself" what one is, comes to one's
self. . . . Labor here is not determined
through the kind of its objects, nor through
its goal, content, result, etc. but through
what happens to the very human existence in
labor.12
In this larger context labor is not exclusively
economic in character, rather labor is an ontological cate
gory of human experience, characterized by a primordial lack
of existence.

Marcuse's early essay (Telos 16, pp. 9-37)

characterizes labor as having three essential moments:
duration, permanence, and 'burdensomeness'.

Labor's duration

reflects its historical character as a flow of activity
superseding any individual labor; its permanence is its
character as a universal process, and its essential char
acter of being a burden indicates the tyranny of the intersubjective field in which labor takes place.

Man labors

because his existence is not passively, i.e., biologically
determined, and he must make his world his own through the
mediating activity of production and reproduction.
The tyranny of the intersubjective field is most evi
dently the tyranny of domination in the economic dimension
of human production and reproduction, in the necessary fact
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of directing and directed labor in the battle with material
scarcity.

But labor is more than an economic activity

taking place in the realm of necessity, it is also a pro
cess rooted in the ontological condition

of human existence,

and this primordial lack persists in the

realm of freedom

where man still faces the facticity of his history as some
thing other, something not of his own making.
The essential factual content of labor is not
grounded in the scarcity of goods, nor in a dis
continuity between the world of disposable and
utilizable goods and human needs, but, on the
contrary, in an essential excess of human e x 
istence beyond every possible situation in which
it finds itself and the world.
Being human is
always more than its present existence.
It goes
beyond every possible situation and precisely
because of this there is always an ineliminable
discrepancy between the two:
a discrepancy
that demands constant labor for its overcoming,
even though human existence can never rest in
possession of itself and its w o r l d . 13
The goal of the doing that is labor is precisely
human existence, self-realization of both the individual and
species being that takes place both in the realm of neces
sity (material production and reproduction)

and in the realm

of freedom which lies beyond necessity and yet is inextri
cably reciprocal with it.

The possibilities of the realm of

freedom open upon man's true possibilities of self-reali
zation only as an expression of the move beyond necessity,
and as such what man may become is informed by what he must
become.

In the realm of freedom man is confronted still

with his ontological condition, he must still create himself
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as that being who is persistently beyond his present, who
always and everywhere lacks his existence.

Yet in the realm

of freedom man is able to become what he can become,
” ...

praxis in the 'realm of freedom’ is the authentic

praxis and 'goal' to which all other labor is directed:

the

free unfolding of existence in its true possibilities."^^
Labor is man's mode of Being-In-The-World in whatever
shape that may take.

The shape that it may take is not

determined by its specific objects, means, or ends, but
rather by what transpires in the process as it is lived, the
mutual transformation of both subject and object in the
unity of thought and action

(praxis).

When man labors in

the world, he objectifies himself there,

"man 'objectifies'

himself and the object becomes 'his'; it becomes a human
object."

15

But neither man nor his imagined goal, nor his

activity nor the object ever leave the world which is a l 
ready there and given to him as a human world.

Nor does the

philosopher, still less the artist ever leave the human
world in describing it, and his labor is no less transforming.
Authentic labor is the historically conscious reali
zation of individual and species being through the mutual
and reciprocal transformation of both subject and object.
The realization of individual being implies conscious control
over both the means by which the transformation is effected,
and the human disposition of the end products.

The
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realization of species-being implies the conscious affir
mation of the historical destiny of the species,

freedom.

The historically conscious realization of individual being
requires the recognition of the context of past labor in
which human life subsists, the processes of imagination and
creation as well as the machinery and technical apparatus.
It requires further a consciousness of the limits of
facticity imposed by the given world as something to be em 
braced or rejected and thus transformed.

All human doing

that is labor has a social context that is rational or ir 
rational according to the promise of the often occluded
destiny of the species.

The relation of social context and

individual self-realization is a dialectical one in which
truth emerges from the amorphous background of human history
through the laboring individual— whether or not the indi
vidual motives are informed.
Authentic labor is rarely realized at this moment of
history, and when labor is seen from this more fundamental
perspective it becomes apparent that alienated

artistic

labor is as prevalent as alienated industrial labor, and for
the same reasons.

Yet the dialectical tension that holds

individual and species being in its dynamic relationship as
human history unfolds, must consciously inform the intersubjective field in which the human imagination identifies
itself.

We can imagine that dimension of existence for
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ourselves only so long as we recognize in the realm of
necessity those elements which are no longer necessary and
are therefore irrational.

To the extent that we stand

beyond the realm of necessity and recognize it as necessary
but not yet sufficient for the satisfaction of our essential
humanity, we fuel the flames of critical reason and strive
for what we are not yet:

free and self-consciously human.

In our commodity culture the characteristics of industrial
alienation appear primary, and serve as the foil of artistic
labor; but only where there remains critical rationality.
This situation presents itself to us as one in which artis
tic and technological labor appear contradictory both in the
labor process and in the end products, but this contra
diction is really part of a larger loss of historical con
sciousness— we are historically lost in an age of discon
tinuity.
Conclusion:

The Intersubjective Field

Let us suppose that we had carried out production
as human beings.
Each of us would have in two
ways affirmed himself and the other person.
1)
In my production I would have objectified my
individuality, its specific character, and there
fore enjoyed not only an individual manifes
tation of my life during the activity, but also
. . . the pleasure of knowing my personality to
be objective, visible to the senses and hence a
power beyond all doubt.
2) In your enjoyment
or use of my product I would have the direct
enjoyment of . . . having satisfied a human need
by my work. . . . 3) I would have been for you
the mediator between you and the species . . .
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recognized and felt by you yourself as a neces
sary part of yourself, and consequently would
know myself to be confirmed both in your thought
and your love.
4) In the individual expression
of my life I would have directly created your e x 
pression of your life, and therefore in my indi
vidual activity I would have directly confirmed
and realised my true nature, my human nature,
my communal natu r e . Our products would be so
many mirrors in which we saw reflected our e s 
sential nature.16
In this extraordinary passage is reflected the trans
formed consciousness of the free and self-determining human
being.

It is utopian only insofar as it presupposes the

abolition of private property, the abolition of quantita
tively determined measures of value for the quality of human
production.

The productive process takes on a new and uni

quely human meaning, and the prejudice for the object, for
the end product of human labor, vanishes before the fasci
nation in the reciprocal interchange between individual and
species being, between subjectivity and objectivity, and
between individuals— characterized by love.
Qualitative descriptions are not accidental in this
passage; there is a conscious move beyond the strictures of
quantitative methodology to the heart of the matter con
cerning human labor.

The mystification is stripped away,

and what is revealed is human intersubjectivity in all its
marvelous complexity.

Within the intersubjective field lies

the possibility for the re-unification of instrumental and
critical reason;

for the reconciliation of technology and

art.
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Art is committed to that perception of the
world which alienates individuals from their
functional existence and performance in
society— it is committed to an emancipation
of sensibility, imagination, and reason in all
spheres of subjectivity and objectivity.i?
Technology is the vehicle which allows the possibility of
such an emancipation, for in the realm of necessity where
material scarcity predominates, there is no vision of eman
cipation for species-being, and the emancipation of indi
vidual being is contingent upon the domination of indi
vidual beings.

The alienation of individuals from their

functional existence and performance in society allows for
the recognition of relationships previously obscured by the
productive process.

The separation of art from the p ro

ductive process has allowed for the demystification of the
social, historical, and material reality that is the result
of that process.
Artistic labor is the apotheosis of all human labor,
for while it is not primarily economic activity, the process
of artistic production involves more dynamically than any
other the critical and instrumental powers of human intel
ligence.

Because art maintains the critical tension between

what is and what ought to be, it reflects on a higher level
the ontological condition of man.

Art, like all authentic

labor, generally is the historically conscious realization of
individual and species being through the mutual and
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reciprocal transformation of both subject and object.

How

ever, the function of art, its truth in the intersubjective
field "lies in its power to break the monopoly of estab
lished reality

(i.e., of those who established it) to

18
define what is real."

As such art is a very special form

of labor, the highest form, because it establishes itself on
the frontiers of human consciousness where value meets the
void of human possibilities.
The unity occluded by the excesses of instrumentalism
has been preserved throughout human history by the redeeming
power of art.

The forgotten mythic unity can be reestab

lished by aligning the productive processes in the realm of
necessity with the ontological imperatives of human labor;
by recognizing on the mundane level of life (on the level
where men work and reproduce themselves)

the values of

artistic labor as that toward which all life approaches— the
free expression of human potentialities. Reason in its
highest expression.
Eventually all things merge into one, and a river
runs through it.
The river was cut by the world's
great flood and runs over rocks from the basement
of time.
On some of the rocks are timeless rain
drops.
Under the rocks are the words, and some
of the words are theirs.
I am haunted by waters.
Norman Maclean, A River Runs Through It^^
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Footnotes
^Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston, 1964),
p. 147.
2

William Leiss, The Domination of Nature
1972), Chapter 5.

(Boston,

3Ibid., p. 122.
^Ibid., p. 146.
^Ibid., p. 145.
^See Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of
Enlightenment (New York, 1972).
7
Leiss, The Domination of Nature, pp. 150-51.
^Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable

(New York, 196 5),

p. 291.
^Herbert Marcuse, "Some Social Implications of Modern
Technology," Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, vol.
14 (1941), 4 1 4 - 3 9 .
^°Ibid., 421.
^^Leiss.

The Domination of Nature, p. 28.

12

Herbert Marcuse, "On the Philosophical Foundation
of the Concept of Labor in Economics," Telos, no. 16 (Sum
mer 1973), p. 13. This essay is explicated in part below,
and substantially influences what follows.
l^Ibid. p. 22.
l^Ibid., p. 31.
l^ibid., p. 13
^^Karl Marx, "Comments on James Mill, Elemens d '
économie politique," The Collected Works of Karl M a r x , Vol. 3
(New York, 1975), pp. 227-28.
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18 Ibid., p. 9.
l^Norman Maclean, A River Runs Through It and Other
Stories (Chicago, 1976), p. 104.
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Introduction
The countless dualisms in Western philosophy suggest
the tension in human thought prompted by the negating power
of reason itself.

The tension between reality and appear

ance, light and dark, fact and value, freedom and necessity
array themselves throughout history without final resolution.
Our age suggests another dualism, rooted in the Greek tra
dition and nurtured in the Renaissance, between the material
and the ideal.

To experience these dualisms is perhaps what

it means to be human, it is a function of man's ontological
nature to be always in process from what ^

toward what is

not quite yet but ought to b e .
The problem for a critical theory of society is to
ground criticism in legitimate universality where it is it
self free from charges of partiality, ideology, and particu
larity.

It is an open and continuing process that has not

been realized, perhaps cannot be completely realized, but
nevertheless ought to be.

The attempt to ground critical

theory might well begin by asking the question as to the
object of that theory, i.e., of what is critical theory
critical?

The answer, as indicated by the preceeding

papers, is domination.

The unspoken ground of critical

theory is an interest in human freedom as the ultimate
human value.
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The dualism that critical theory must overcome is
precisely that between fact (domination)

and value

(freedom).

The problem inherent in this dualism involves the entire
normative realm, since within a dominated social situation
one might expect to have distorted perceptions not only of
the material situation but also of that normative realm
posited by the dominant culture to sustain itself.

Where

else can one stand when criticizing the dominating culture
but firmly under its thumb?

To appeal to history, or

culture, is to appeal not only to that which offers the pro
mise of liberation but also to that which has interests in
the preservation of the status quo.

One's own interests in

the future are hopelessly tinged with the interests of the
dominating social system that sustains the very notion of
the future in the first place.

The facticity of modern mass

culture is overwhelming, both in terms of its material base
and in terms of idealist destiny:

both may appear as

rational and necessary.
The tension between a materialist theory of history
(Marx).and an idealist theory of reason (Hegel) provides much
of the fertile ground for critical theory.

The attempt of

the Frankfurt School to enfuse the Marxian critique of poli
tical economy with a critique of culture resulted in a shift
of emphasis that many felt did not preserve the unity of the
two.

Herbert Marcuse's 1933 essay "On the Philosophical

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Foundation of the Concept of Labor in Economics"^ was an
attempt to ground critical theory in an analysis of labor as
an ontological category, i.e., to expand the notion of labor
in a way that would allow for a consideration of culture
while maintaining the most fundamental category of histori
cal materialism,

labor.

This essay has been criticized on

various grounds, most notably for its "subjectivism," yet it
nevertheless reflects the need for a critique of instru
mental Marxism, for a critical theory of society and the
individual which develops a philosophical examination of the
foundations of historical materialism.
This is also the intention of Jurgen Habermas, whose
work involves a linguistic examination of the foundations of
historical materialism.^

Both Marcuse and Habermas see

essentially the same problem in this regard:

the need for

a philosophical basis for a critical theory of society that
overcomes the tension between materialism and idealism wi t h 
out sacrificing one for the other.

Habermas replaces labor

as the central core of critical theory with symbolic inter
action and communication theory, arguing with extraordinary
persuasiveness that language is a universal category of human
experience

(as is labor).

The focus of both Marcuse and

Habermas is clearly the intersubjective field where reso
lutions of historical significance unfold through human
praxis, and while both acknowledge the importance of material
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production and reproduction, both deny its exclusive primacy
and reassert the socio-cultural dimension.
The historical moment of the Frankfurt School saw the
emergence of a new attention to socio-cultural phenomena,
a revived interest in psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology,
and art.

The tremendous productivity of the group over

shadowed the political-economic dimensions of life which,
though not forgotten, were perhaps neglected in the effort
to overcome the excesses of Soviet Marxism.

The critique of

instrumental reason became the primary task of critical
theory, and resulted in the revitalization of the dialectical
tension between culture and economics.

But obviously the

analysis of either side of the problem to the exclusion of
the other results in no lasting understanding of the ad 
vanced capitalist industrial state.

Both spheres of society

must be understood as dialectically interdependent, which
means the analysis must focus on a ground where idealism and
materialism meet.
The thesis of this project is that the ground where
culture and economics meet is human labor understood as the
historically conscious realization of individual and species
being through the mutual and reciprocal transformation of
both subject and object— the definition of authentic labor.*

*See page 17, 18 of the second paper,

"On the Ontological
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It is further suggested that the unacknowledged paradigm in
the ideal speech situation described by Habermas is a r t ,
the previously described apotheosis of labor.

The tremen

dously subtle analysis of Habermas directs critical theory
to a consideration of language, symbolic interaction, as
the new focus of an analysis previously directed at con
sciousness.

The magnitude of his critical theory surpasses

the narrow focus of this paper, and promises fertile ground
for the future of all critical theory.

The openness of his

analysis promises the rebirth of an optimistic and erotic
critical theory firmly grounded in the "intention of the
-j

good and true life."
Jurgen Habermas:

Communication Theory

In light of Legitimation Crisis,^ the problem of
developing a Marxist aesthetic can now be integrated with
the totality of the normative sphere which finds its ulti
mate expression in the communicative ethic :
Only communicative ethics guarantees the gen
erality of admissible norms and the autonomy
of acting subjects solely through the discur
sive redeemability of the validity claims with
which norms appear.
That is, generality is
guaranteed in that the only norms that may claim
generality are those on which everyone affected
agrees without constraint if they enter into a

Character of Labor." Note that labor in this context is more
than mere economic activity.
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process of discursive will formation. . . .
^
Only communicative ethics is universal. . . .
In our own century the very possibility of intersub
jectivity has come under devastating attack;

philosophically

in the ontology of Jean-Paul Sartre, and poetically in
literature depicting the triumph of the art of failure.

We

have had our existential moment, thankfully, yet we curi
ously linger with the aesthetic nostalgia of the old
literary forms which hold open for us the mysteriousness
of an impenetrable subjectivity as the illusion against
which there can be only a mutilated and impoverished reality.
We are reminded, with a similar yet possibly less perverse
nostalgia, of the strange intercourse between Socrates and
Euthyphro concerning the nature of Piety, that most intersubjective of all the Greek virtues:
Socrates :
Euthyphro:
Socrates:

Euthyphro:
Socrates :

Euthyphro:
Socrates:

Have we not also said, Euthyphro,
that there are quarrels and disagree
ments and hatreds among the gods?
We have.
But what kind of disagreement, my
friend, causes hatred and anger?
Let us look at the matter thus.
If you and I were to disagree as
to whether one number were more than
another, would that make us angry
and enemies?
Should we not settle
such a dispute at once by counting?
Of course.
And if we were to disagree as to the
relative size of two things, we should
measure them and put an end to the
disagreement at once, should we not?
Yes.
And should we not settle a question
about the relative weight of two
things by weighing them?
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Euthyphro:
Socrates:

Of course.
Then what is the question which
would make us angry and enemies if
we disagreed about it, and could not
come to a settlement? Perhaps you
have not an answer ready; but listen
to mine.
Is it not questions of the
just and unjust, of the honorable
and the dishonorable, of the good
and the bad?
Is not questions about
these matters which make you and me
and everyone else quarrel, when we
do quarrel, if we differ about them
and can reach no satisfactory agree
ment?®

Running beneath all Socratic dialogues is the field of inter
subjectivity that is the fertile ground out of which disa
greements may grow, a ground that sponsors enough commonality
to give rise to the fantastic diversity of classical Greek
culture.

The profound subtlety of Socrates presents us di f 

ference founded upon and rooted in the polis, the arena
within which Greek humanity was realized.

The dialogue con

cludes inconclusively, of course, piety at least never gets
reified.
But there is an interesting similarity between the
ethical power which illuminates and nurtures Socratic wisdom,
and the commitment of Habermas to the "good and true life,"
because it is ultimately that commitment which infuses his
theory of communicative competence with truth.
For Habermas language is the peculiarly human medium
of socially symbolic interaction which provides the field
against and within which human life becomes intelligible.
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use the term 'field' consciously and by doing so invoke the
phenomenological notion of a field of perception within and
against which intentionality operates, and concomitantly the
field of history within which intentionality functions as
future oriented motivation.

There is both a certain 'given

ness' about language and also a normative openness, as lan
guage becomes both solidified as a cultural constant and
the vehicle through which all cultural constants can be artic
ulated and reconstituted.

There is agreement between sub

jects as to the use of symbols and features of language which
is generative and capable of reconstruction in the case of
degeneration

(universal pragmatics).

Universal pragmatics

"exhibit both the normative basis of all communication and
the possibility of systematically distorted communication."

7

The constitution of the field of consensus against
which language is operative is contingent upon the mutual
recognition of at least four different types of validity
claims involved in the exchange of speech acts:
Claims that the utterance is understandable,
that its prositional content is true, and that
the speaker is sincere in uttering it, and
that it is right or appropriate for the speaker
to be performing the speech act.
When all of these claims are accepted, as they are in normal
speech, communication occurs; when they are not they may be
restored through metacommunication which seeks to remove the
disturbance and reestablish the original or a new background
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consensus.

The form of metacommunication in which the truth

or correctness of an opinion or norm is established is called
discourse— which differs from normal speech acts because it
requires suspension of judgment as to the empirical context
of the speech act, suspension of action and action oriented
motivation which may occlude understanding and suspension of
judgment as to the correctness of certain norms.
munication,

Normal com

"context of interaction," naively accepts what

in discourse is suspended, yet it always assumes that in event
of a breakdown resort to metacommunication is always possible
to reestablish mutual understanding.

That this suppositional

accountability is counter-factual, that pure communicative
action rarely occurs, is acknowledged by Habermas, while he
simultaneously holds that the expectation can be explained in
a theory of systematically distorted communication.

Language

and the communicative field are not transcendental disem
bodiments of cultural experience, but are sustained through
consensus garnered in the existential social milieu through
intersubjective reciprocity.

This reciprocity is impaired

by relations of inequality and domination, usually taking
the form of repression which denies the possibility of con
sensus, or at least makes problematic the cognizance of ap
parent and real forms of consensus.

In other words, the onto

logical duality here is not absolute between two subjects
since it is mediated by the intersubjectivity constituted

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10

communication process, yet equal access to the process, ac 
cess which would absolutely ensure authentic communication
is in turn compromised by the inequalities of class, educat
ion, motivation, and other factors.

It becomes a matter of

second nature to operate within a distorted language field,
i.e., within a field where consensus is acknowledged as
illusory.
Habermas' problem, in terms of the above-mentioned
Socratic analogy, is to illustrate those possibilities for
pure communicative action within a social situation where
what is being measured is tinged with human interest— the
agreement between Socrates and Euthyphro as to what measures
to employ in matters of weight and volume, is of a quali
tatively different kind than the agreement as to the nature
of piety.

Euthyphro, after all, is about to testify against

his father in a murder trial.

Which criteria of consensus

are really true within a systematically distorted communica
tion field, and how can discursively realized agreement be
distinguished from the mere appearance of agreement?
In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas maintains
himself faithful to the core of the classical tradition of
philosophy; to the insight that the truth of statements is
linked in the last analysis to the intention of the "good
Q

and true life."

Argumentation is the means by which truth

claims can become discursively justified or discursively
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redeemed.

What is to be found in the notion of truth must

be approached through an analysis of discursive justifica
tion, which for Habermas is a normative concept:

"Truth is

not the fact that a consensus is realized, but rather that
at all times and in any place, if we enter into a discourse
a consensus can be realized under conditions that identify
it as a justified consensus.

Truth means

'warranted asser-

tability'.
The speech act carries with it the supposition that
communication is possible.

Discourse into the truth or

falsity of a statement or the correctness of a norm similarly
assumes the possibility of agreement— indeed the denial of
this is tantamount to the denial of speech per se, and con
demns itself as soon as it is uttered.

The logic is the

same whether we speak of speaking qua speaking or of an art
which has as its object the abolition of itself.

The irony

of Samuel Beckett, for example, is that his novel that was
to destroy the novel as an art form (The Trilogy) is an em i 
nently successful novel.

So it is with metacommunication:

the fact that we engage in it presupposes a belief on our
part that the issue will be decided according to the rules
of logic and the force of the better argument, and not by
the contingencies of fetters on our communication.

Our com

munication is unfettered:
. . . When for all participants there is a sym
metrical distribution of chances to select and
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employ speech acts, when there is an effective
equality of chances to assume dialogue roles
. . . (when) all participants . . . have the
same chance to initiate and perpetuate dis
course, to put forward, call into question,
and give reasons for or against statements,
explanations, interpretations, and justifi
cations . . . (and) have the same chance to
express attitudes, feelings, intentions . . .
and to command, to oppose, to permit, to for
bid, etc. ^
These are the conditions of the ideal speech situation, and
are identical with the conditions for an ideal form of life;
"they include linguistic conceptualizations of the tra
ditional ideals of freedom and justice.

'Truth', therefore,

cannot be analyzed independently of 'freedom' and justice
Art, if it is to be authentic communication, has
ideally the same requirements as pure communicative inter
action.

Not only can art be seen within this model of inter-

subjective communication, but can also be as paradigmatical
and can take itself as the object of its expression and
thereby become a form of metacommunication of meta-art.

When

this happens, the result is often the destructing of a tra
ditional field of aesthetic intentionality, and the speech
with which art transforms itself often exceeds the communi
cative competence of linguistic expression per se.

Yet what

is presupposed in the 'beautiful illusion' is precisely what
is/^resupposed in normal communication, i.e., the ideal con
ditions for an ideal form of life, the ideas of freedom and
justice.

These ideal conditions rarely, if ever, exist for
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art anymore than for actual speech, but as for actual speech
they may serve as the ground from which systematic distor
tions of aesthetic communication are critiqued.
assumes the inseparability of truth and goodness

That ground
and beauty,

of facts, theory, and practice, and is the ground for a
critical theory of society.
Freedom is inherent in the notion of truth and is an
ticipated in every act of communication— linguistic, prac
tical, or aesthetic.

All social relations must be accepted

and legitimated by its members and as such the legitimation
has a democratic character.

When the democratic character

of cultural affirmation is denied, it must be denied from
the ground of an ideology that claims the impossibility of
rational consensus, or the inappropriateness of discursive
will formation; in short the ideology must be rooted in
psychic repression and manifest itself in distorted communi
cation (fascist art).

Such communication abounds in modern

capitalism, but its prevalence does not represent, even on
the level of metacommunication, the ultimate ontological
nature of human existence and interaction.*

*One of the/problems such writers as Beckett and Sartre pose
is how bad fcaith can be overcome when bad faith postures b e 
come internalized in a rapidly changing environment such
that the original is irretrievably occluded.
In such an
instance we have Nietzsche's philological problem:
the
original is annihilated, so why pretend it exists?
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Habermas discusses the role of bourgeois art in terms
of its autonomy in the face of demands extrinsic to art and
in terms of its ability to strengthen the antagonisms be 
tween the values offered by the socio-cultural system and
those demanded by the political and economic systems.

Bour

geois art operates as a form of critical rationality which
stands over against and provides refuge from the techno
logical rationality of the productive process and the polit
ical ideology which gives it motivational credence.

Against

such technological rationality the artistic refusal often
takes the form of un-reason (and indeed is frequently ir
rational) , but generally only has the appearance of unreason
ableness to a motivational system defined by an efficiency
rationale.

Habermas mentions the three main human and

generalizable needs or interests thus served by bourgeois
art in this capacity:

1) the need for a mimetic relation

with nature, 2) the need for living together in solidarity
outside the group egoism of the immediate family, 3) the
longing for the happiness of a communicative experience
exempt from the imperatives of purposive rationality.

This

latter need elso reflects the deeply human and profoundly
revolutionary drive for creative spontaneity.

This char

acterization of art has it fulfilling human needs which can
find no satisfaction within privitized religion, scientistic
philosophy, or utilitarian morality:

"Thus, along with moral
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universalism, art and aesthetics

{from Schiller to Marcuse)

are explosive ingredients built into the bourgeois ideology.
But modern art for Habermas is post-Auratic art, art
created under those conditions described by Walter Benjamin
in his famous 1936 essay "The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction."^^

A consideration of this essay

is necessary for a fuller understanding of Habermas' inade
quately brief analysis.
Walter Benjamin:

Mechanical Reproduction of Art

Benjamin argues that although works of art have al
ways been in principle reproducible by imitation, the mechan
ical reproduction of the work of art represents something new.
Beginning with Greek founding and stamping, through the
development of the woodcut, printing, engraving to the 19th
century discovery of lithography, works of art were variously
reproduced for various motives including profit.

With litho

graphy, it became possible to protray everyday life on a
much more prolific scale, on a scale soon equivalent to
printing.

Lithography was soon replaced with photography,

which for the /first time made the mediating labor of the hand
superfluous, reducing its function to that of the eye looking
through a lens.

Photography implied the film just as surely

as lithography implied the illustrated newspaper.

By 1900

all works of art could be mechanically reproduced, and the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16

reproductive process itself became an art form.

This had

profound repercussions on the ways in which the public was
to come to 'consume' art.
But all reproduction of a work of art lacks the
"presence in time and space" of the original, i.e., the
whole "sphere of authenticity" lies outside the possibility
of reproduction

(both manual and mechanical).

Furthermore,

the process of mechanical reproduction captures aspects of
the original inaccessible to natural vision

(for example

enlargement and slow motion) while at the same time putting
the copy of the original into situations which would be im
possible for the original (for example listening to opera
in the shower).

The problem, and it is a significant one,

is that the integrity of the original, its "quality of
presence" is always depreciated:
In the case of the art object, a most sensitive
nucleus— namely, its authenticity— is inter
fered with. . . . The authenticity of a thing
is the essence of all that is transmissible
from its beginning, ranging from its substan
tive duration to its testimony to the history
which ^t has experienced.
Since the historical
testimony rests on the authenticity, the former,
too, is jeopardized by reproduction when sub
stantive duration ceases to matter.
And what
is really jeopardized when the historical
testimony is affected is the authority of the
object.
One might subsume the eliminated element
in the term 'aura' and go on to say: that which
withers in the age of mechanical reproduction
is the aura of the work of a r t . 15
Consequently, the work of art is wrenched from its
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traditional field, and in place of the unique object and the
powerful experiences it exudes is substituted an uncon
trolled number of ’faded' copies.
analogy is apropos.)

(Again the iNietzschean

The copies now encounter the beholder

in his own unique situation, reactivating themselves there
and serving to shatter tradition.
were obvious :

" . . .

The implications in 1936

the liquidation of the traditional

value of cultural heritage."

The example Benjamin naturally

seizes upon is the phenomena of the great historical film;
an "invitation to a far reaching liquidation."^^
Modes of human sense perception change over long
periods of time and in accordance with changes in modes of
human existence.

Benjamin argues that changes in the con

temporary mode of perception can be understood as the decay
of the aura caused not only by the mechanical reproduction
of art objects, but further by the tremendous popularity of
mass media.

His worst fears would be confirmed by television.

Benjpmin draws the familiar analogy of the concept of
aura to natural objects:
objects)

"We define the aura of (natural

as the unique phenomenon of a distance, however

close it may be.

If, while resting on a summer afternoon,

you follow with your eyes a mountain range on the horizon
or a branch which casts its shadow over you, you experience
the aura of those mountains, of that b r a n c h . T h e

social

basis of the decay of the aura rests on two habits of mind
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characteristic of the contemporary masses:

the desire to

bring things spatially and humanly closer, and to reduce
the uniqueness of all art objects and situations to banality
by accepting their mechanical reproduction.

Benjamin saw

this burgeoning penchant for the acquisition of close range
likenesses multiplied everywhere; in magazines, newsreels,
and films, and everywhere it demonstrated for him a pre
ference for transitoriness and reproducibility over unique
ness and permanence.

"To pry an object from its shell, to

destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception whose

'sense

of the universal equality of things' has increased to such
a degree that it extracts it even from a unique object by
means of reproduction.

Thus is manifested in the field of

perception what in the theoretical sphere is noticeable in
the increasing importance of statistics."

18

The transition from the uniqueness of the work of
art which retains its aura to the total reversal of the
function of art in the age of mechanical reproduction
the transition from ritual to politics.

is

Since the original

contextual tradition of art was expressive of the cult, and
the work first appeared in the service of magical then
religious ritual, the existence of the work of art is never
entirely separated from its ritual function.

The advent of

photography roughly coincides with the advent of socialism,
and the response of art is to become theological in defense
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of its aura which is now clearly threatened, i.e., art
denies its social function and its categorization by subject
matter and becomes

'pure'.

The consequent age of mechanical reproduction heralds
the emancipation of the work from its dependence upon ritual,
and becomes an object destined from its inception to be
reproduced.

This means that authenticity is no longer an

ingredient of artistic creation which amounts to a total
reversal of the function of art.

"Instead of being based on

ritual, it begins to be based on another practice— politics."
The two polar types of art distinguished according to
value are works with cult value
religious statues, etc.)

(ceremonial, cave drawings,

and works with exhibition value.

For the cave man the art work's importance was not contin
gent upon its being exhibited; and today the cult value of
a work seems to demand that it remain hidden.
tomb seemsy a classic example :

King Tut's

with the liberation of most

art practices goes the increasing opportunity for them to
be exhibited in settings other than the original, in the
case of Tut it is impossible to send the entire pyramid
around the world.

One is also reminded of the obelisks in

the center of Paris, brought there by Napoleon from Egypt.
Obviously the same holds for a visual work done on canvas as
opposed to one more permanently affixed to its setting, as
a fresco.

The increase in fitness for exhibition which is
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consequent upon increased capacities for technical repro
duction has resulted in a qualitative transformation of the
work's nature.

Today the emphasis is exclusively on its

exhibition, which means it now has entirely new functions,
among which the one we are conscious of, the artistic
function.

We may well wonder at what point that artistic

function will be transformed into an incidental function
just as the cave drawing has now become

'artistic'.

Photography and the film are the obvious bearers of
this new function, but with them, or at least with photog
raphy, there is a retrenchment to the cult value in portrai
ture.

The portrait was the obvious focal point of early

photography, and the aura of those early portraits still
clings to the photograph long after it has been removed from
its historical circumstance.

But as soon as man absents hi m 

self from the photographic image the exhibition value man i 
fests itself.

Benjamin reminds us of the haunting uneasi

ness of photographs of empty streets,
the scene of a crime."

20

"taken as evidence at

As photographs become the standard

evidence of historical occurrences they begin to acquire a
hidden political significance in which the viewer is chal
lenged forth out of "free-floating contemplation" to another,
more appropriate vision.
At the same time picture magazines begin to put
up sign posts for him, right ones or wrong ones,
no matter.
For the first time captions have
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become obligatory.
And it is clear that they
have an altogether different character than
the title of a painting.
The directives which
captions give . . . soon become even more ex 
plicit and more imperative in the film where
the meaning of each single picture appears to
be prescribed by the sequence of all proceeding
ones.^1
All of this amounts to the destruction of the auton
omy of art caused by the separation of art from its basis in
cult:

photography and the film have radically transformed

the entire nature of art, which can be seen nowhere as
clearly as in the comparison of the stage actor to the
screen actor.

The screen actor's performance is presented

not to the audience, but to the camera, to a camera that
need not intuit the performance as a whole, and to a camera
that constantly shifts its perspective, to a camera that
does not establish intersubjactivity between actor and
audience.

^Similarly, of course, the audience can no longer

maintain the intersubjective symbiosis with the performers—
which has powerful ramifications within the intersubjective
field of the audience itself, i.e., it can totally abolish
it.

The audience identifies with the camera, or the camera

man, who remains forever anonymous.^2
The actor for the first time creates for a mechanical
contrivance with his whole living person, while that contri
vance has no respect for the actor's aura.

The aura, as we

have already seen, cannot be reproduced, since it is rooted
in the actor's presence.

The aura of Othello and the aura
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of Sir Lawrence Olivier on the stage cannot be separated,
but when that performance is viewed by the camera of Polansky, both the auras vanish:
"beautiful semblance."

art has left the realm of the

It is called mirror estrangement;

the estrangement of seeing before a mirror is compounded by
the transportability of the mirrored image.

The implications

for politics are even more ominous than for art.

How does

the film industry, for whom these alienations are marketing
problems, respond?

By reconstituting the aura by artifi

cially building the actor's or the candidate's personality
outside of the performance, by packaging the commodity.
The extent to which the mechanical reproduction of
ajTt has changed the reactions of the masses toward art is
néwhere as evident as in the film, where the immediate fusion
of visual and emotional enjoyment acquires tremendous social
significance.

The reluctance to adapt to innovations in

painting is starkly contrasted with the immediate acceptance
of innovation in the cinema:
The greater the decrease in the social signifi
cance of an art form, the sharper the distinction
between criticism and enjoyment.
The conven
tional is uncritically enjoyed, and the truly
new is criticized with aversion.
With regard
to the screen, the critical and the receptive
attitudes of the public coincide.
The decisive
reason for this is that individual reactions
are predetermined by the mass audience response
they are about to produce, and this is nowhere
more pronounced than in the film.
The moment
these responses become manifest they control
each other.23
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The dark intersubjectivity of the theatre is the breeding
ground for a universal critical aesthetic consciousness that
is an impossibility even in the largest gallery.

The single

Picasso can be viewed simultaneously by a relatively small
number of people

(Benjamin sees the large numbers flocking

to galleries at the end of the 19th century as a crisis in
painting!), and was intended as such.

It simply is not an

object for a large simultaneous collective experience.

In

deed the crisis in painting is related to the fact that in
sofar as painting is now an object of mass consumption, it
is so in a radically different manner than ever before.
Today t^ere is no opportunity to approach painting gradually,
through a period of lived experience in which meaning
emerges distinctly, rather one encompasses "French Impres
sionism" at the Chicago Art Institute in a single afternoon.
"There is no way for the masses to organize and control
themselves in their reception.

Thus the same public which

responds in a progressive manner toward a grotesque film is
bound to respond in a reactionary manner to

s u r r e a l i s m .

"24

Benjamin's essay is considerably more positive in its
anticipation of the human uses of the film and other mechan
ical reproductions than was the response of Adorno and other
members of the Frankfurt School who felt that the tra
ditionally political function of art as providing the
beautiful illusion of the "other" society was being abrogated
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by the new mass art.

They feared the new political function

of mass art was to be the reconciliation of the masses to
the status quo.

Benjamin disagreed.

He lamented the loss

of the aura while simultaneously holding out the hope for
the progressive potential of politicized, collectivized
art.^^

He does this by being more open to the positive

character of what is undeniably a negative feature of the
film, distraction.

His analysis recognizes the impossibility

of solving the problem of class consciousness by contem
plation alone.

Many of history's problems are mastered

gradually, tjy living them through in accordance with a
reasonable ^aith in human perception itself.
The return to Habermas is a return to the mainstreams
of the Frankfurt School's aesthetic theory and critique of
mass culture, but for us with the additional tool of his
theory of communicative competence.

His treatment of post-

auratic art is cast in the social and cultural context of
the 1960s and 19 70s, which means that post-auratic art finds
at least partial expression in the counter-culture.
In the 19th century bourgeois art came to achieve a
brilliant autonomy in terras of other contexts of interaction
and employment external to it.

Its values were characteris

tically Bohemian, and as such grew directly out of the center
of bourgeois culture as a radical negation of its motiva
tional presuppositions:

possessive individualism, the
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Protestant ethic, etc.

The bourgeois work of art originally

functioned as a kind of alter ego to the 19th century com
modity owner, a corrective to the excesses of the productive
process which characterized his intersubjective relations as
relations of domination and repression and distorted com
munication.

In the pristine environment of the drawing room

and the gallery the bourgeois could, through solitary contem
plation reestablish contact with sublime humanity, with the
species being which lurked behind his world on the side of
its reverential nature.

This original aura came to embody

a critical attitude toward bourgeois values— a noisy and
hostile howjling against the pretentions of repressively di s 
torted communication.

Art became avant garde, seductive,

and unalterably alienated itself from its patron.

The

bourgeoisie could no longer find in the artistically beauti
ful its own redemption and happiness; that happiness was not
simply suspended in everyday life, but was in fact crushed
by it:
In the aura of the bourgeois work of art— that
is, in the cultist emjoyment of the already
secularized, museum-ripe shrine— was mirrored
a belief in the reality of the beautiful il
lusion.
This belief crumbled along with the
aura.^ 6
The truth is that bourgeois society cannot produce an art
that would express the realization of human freedom through
the apotheosis of technological rationality, because that
rationality has stifled the possibility of its critical
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self-consciousness by forcing the ground of that self-con
sciousness out into the cold night of unreason.
It is within the amorphous arena of 'modern art' that
bourgeois art is transubstantiated into the counter-culture.
Surrealism is the specific historical moment in which the
transubstantiation is affected, in which the "no-longerbeautiful illusion" passes desublimated over into life.

27

This destruction of aesthetic distance was not produced by
the techniques of mechanical reproduction as Benjamin has
argued, butjrather was already accomplished by the trans
formation of the art work into a commodity relation with its
consumer and producer.

Mechanical reproduction certainly

accelerated that process, but the break was already present
at the point at which modern art made the process of p ro
duction evident by presenting itself as something that was
produced, i.e., that has a use-value and has therefore sur
rendered its autonomy.

The point seems to be that both are

correct, and that the relationship between modern ritualism
(at least insofar as it reflects itself within the religious
tradition)

and politics is both discontinuous and at the same

time anchored in an anti-human subjectivism that is counter
revolutionary.

Whether or not art concerns itself with the

former, it can no longer refuse its political dimension.

By

presenting itself as something produced for consumption, art
implicates itself in the commodity culture regardless of
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whether the initial art work was intended for mass p ro
duction.

All art is now potentially reproducible, if by no

other means than its recorded passage by the press and news
media; and it is precisely this recorded and interpreted
passage and its mass distribution that gives art its tre
mendous political use-value.

The work of art now no longer

confoirms to one of the essential features of authentic
labor, i.e., the artist no longer has control over the means
of its production and reproduction and eventual distribution.
This is the!context in which an alienated and distorted
art must somehow find itself.
Conclusion
Renunciation of the aesthetic form does not
cancel the difference between art and life—
but it does cancel that between essence and
appearance, in which the truth of art has its
home and which determines the political value
of art. . . . A subversive counterculture to 
day is conceivable only in contradiction to
the prevailing art industry and its heteronomous art.
That is to say, a real counter
culture would have to insist on the autonomy
of art, on its own autonomous a r t . 28
Critical theory remains a critique of domination, but
of domination understood in all of its forms
political, cultural, and artistic.

economic,

As such it implies a

human interest in the free expression of individual and
species being.

That expression occurs through authentic

human labor now understood as an ontological category of
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human existence.

Just as critical theory requires the bal

ance of a critique of culture as well as a critique of polit
ical economy, so too does Marxist aesthetics require a cri
tique of artistic form as well as a critique of political
content.

A consistent feature of Marcuse's thought is his

insistence on maintaining the dialectical tension between
materialism and idealism in all dimensions of critical theory.
Habermas also se4ks the ground of critical theory in human
intersubjectivity, in 'symbolic interaction'.

The significant

force of Habermas' theory of communication lies in his
description of the ideal speech situation, the unspoken para
digm of which is authentic artistic labor.
It is significant that Marcuse, at the end of a long
and productive philosophical life, turns to the aesthetic
dimension, where art and radical praxis display such a b e 
wildering affinity and opposition.

Both envision a world

where individuals are liberated from repression and domi
nation; both acknowledge their roots in the given world of
domination.

Yet in the presumed utopia there will be art.

The institutions of a socialist society, even
in their most democratic form, could never
resolve all the conflicts between the univer
sal and the particular, between human beings
and nature, between individual and individual.
Socialism does not and cannot liberate Eros
from Thanatos.
Here is the limit which drives
the revolution beyond any accomplished stage of
freedom; it is the struggle for the impossible,
against the unconquerable whose domain can never
theless be reduced. . . . If people were free,
their art would be the form and expression of
their freedom.29
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Of course, people are not free, artists no less than
the rest of us; the ways in which we symbolically interact
and labor are pre-determined by the medium of that inter
action.

The ideal speech situation, the ideal form of

artistic labor exist only as values we might long for.

We

might long for them not as something lost in the 19th cen
tury, but a^'^omething found in the changed communicative
circumstances, of the 2 0th century.

The age of instantan

eous mass communication systems has altered forever the way
we view ourselves and our human potentialities, and the
artist must find new ways to ground himself and his work in
these changed circumstances.

The problem remains open and

a solution, a resolution seems distant.

We can only imagine

what art might be in the "good utopia," in the realm of
freedom.

We can be as certain in our imaginings that there

is an image as we can be when we enter tinot speech that
there is communication, however inadequate.

We can be just

as certain that our symbolic interactions will be garbled
and distorted in their present context, i.e., in the context
of a dominated and repressed commodity culture, and we might
suppose that art would take notice of the fact.
Artistic labor as defined in these papers is ideal
only insofar as it evokes the memory what was in order to
ground the image of what might be, of what ought to be.
Labor generally and art particularly will take radically
different forms in our future history, if we have one, than
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it has in our recent past.

It is difficult to find embodi

ments of this future in our present— difficult but not im
possible.
life force.

There are artists who affirm Eros, who affirm the
As long as there are, art lives.

\
\
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